Ukrainian Methods for Intercepting Drone Swarms - Could They Work in Israel?

Iranian drone warehouse

Hello, this is The Captain. A Ukrainian acquaintance recently told me that Israelis fear Iranian ballistic missiles mainly because they’ve never yet faced a massive swarm attack by loitering munitions. That scenario isn’t fictional: these small, extremely inexpensive, hard-to-detect and hard-to-defeat weapons can be launched in large numbers and wreak disproportionate havoc. If these flying nightmares were junk food, Iran would be McDonald’s.

In fact, the greatest suffering from such threats has been in Ukraine: since Russia invaded in 2022, thousands of explosive drones - often Iranian-designed - have struck cities, villages, and military bases. Estimates suggest at least 50,000 such systems were launched by late 2025, with some figures around 65,000, resulting in severe infrastructure damage and civilian casualties.

The Cockpit – Ukrainian Drones

Despite these immense numbers, Ukrainian defenders have achieved roughly 80% interception success, a rate not far from Israel’s Iron Dome performance. This is striking given that Ukraine lacks Israel’s advanced long-range radar, fighter jets, or laser defenses. What have they done to manage this threat? And could their techniques be relevant to Israel’s defense doctrine?

Drone strike on a residential building

The Biggest Challenge: Detection

The first and hardest problem with swarms of small drones is detecting them. A formation of 300 loitering munitions does not present a strong radar signature compared to even a handful of large missiles. Moreover, these drones fly low, move unpredictably, and often launch from positions close to defenders. In Ukraine, much of the airspace near cities like Kharkiv is only ~30 km from Russian launch sites, compressing decision time for defenders.

In response, Ukraine developed networks that merge data from many smaller sensors - not just big military radar systems. For example:

• Small radar units distributed across terrain link together to build a real-time air picture.

• Smart cameras scan the sky and share detections.

• Infantry observers and frontline spotters feed positional reports back to a joint system.

• Importantly, civilian apps allow ordinary citizens to report drone movements between population centers.

An anti-radiation missile on its way to the antenna it has locked onto

So, rather than relying on a single big sensor, Ukraine’s system creates many small overlapping detection points that fuse into a coherent air picture. This collective sensing has improved awareness of incoming threats even without high-end hardware.

A particularly clever method is acoustic detection: many Iranian-designed drones produce highly distinctive sound signatures. Acoustic sensor arrays - spaced across positions like microphone networks - can estimate direction, speed, and even identify specific drone types based on the noise pattern. Conceptually, this technique traces back to 19th-century ship-detection systems and was used in World War II for spotting aircraft before radar was ubiquitous.

Microphones for detecting airborne intrusions

In Ukraine today, two separate acoustic networks operate: one covering about 5% of territory, and a larger one with around 15,000 microphones networked together. These feed data into national defense systems, greatly enhancing early awareness of drone swarms.

Interceptor Tactics: Old and New

Intercepting drone swarms also required creativity. Ukraine’s air forces’ options have included:

• Fighter jets equipped with modern radar and infrared sensors, firing air-to-air missiles to destroy drones at a distance.

• Anti-aircraft guns and MANPADS (man-portable air defense systems) at closer ranges.

• Heavier Air Defense systems such as medium and long-range missile batteries provide layered interception.

Interestingly, battlefield footage shows unconventional methods, including:

• Light aircraft like two-seat trainers approaching drones and using onboard weapons to destroy them.

• Helicopters engaging drones at intermediate distances.

• Commercial or improvised drones fitted with explosive or impact payloads purposefully crashing into swarms to disrupt formations.

These creative solutions are practical in a resource-constrained environment but underline that standard air defense doctrine had to be rethought when swarms overwhelmed traditional systems.

Can Ukrainian Methods Be Applied in Israel?

Let’s consider applicability: many Ukrainian detection innovations are rooted in necessity rather than cutting-edge tech. Israel already fields some of the world’s most capable sensors, including long-range radars, satellite and allied intelligence networks, and advanced air defense systems that regularly track small aerial threats better than most countries.

That said, some elements - particularly non-emitting detection like acoustic arrays - could supplement traditional sensors, especially against very low-signature threats that exploit terrain masking. These passive networks don’t reveal their positions and could give additional detection vectors in complex operational environments.

When it comes to intercepting swarms, Israel has a layered defense strategy:

• Fighter aircraft intercept threats with air-to-air missiles at standoff ranges.

• Surface-to-air systems like Iron Dome handle threats closer to populated areas.

• High-energy lasers like Or-Aytan are also tested for certain threat profiles.

For smaller groups or point defense, there may be a role for autonomous counter-drone UAVs - a capability Ukraine is actively developing - but these should supplement, not replace, established systems where reliability and precision matter most.

Bottom Line

Ukraine’s experience shows that resourcefulness and creative adaptation of existing technologies can significantly boost a nation’s ability to detect and defeat large numbers of low-signature aerial threats. Some of those approaches - especially passive and distributed sensing - have potential value even in highly sophisticated defense networks like Israel’s. However, because Israel already operates advanced detection and interception platforms, Ukrainian methods are best viewed as complementary rather than transformative. Efforts that increase situational awareness and redundancy will likely be the most useful additions to existing defenses.

Article by Nitzan Saddan for Calcalist Magazine,